

Appendix 6

Casualty Data

Reporting to date

1. There is a significant delay in the provision of fully verified STATS19 casualty data from Transport for London to the City of London. Currently fully verified data is only available to the end of 2016. As such, to date officers have used provisional casualty data which has been supplied by the City of London Police, in order to gain insight into the influence of the Bank on Safety scheme to casualty numbers at the junction and across the City. At the time of drafting the previous monitoring reports this was the most up to date information available to officers.
2. TFL have since provided provisionally verified STATS19 data to the end of August 2017. This data is unlikely to change but could still be amended. Data from September 2017 onwards still has the potential to be amended from the data being presented in this report whilst it is processed into provisional STATS19 data.
3. Current data has been provided by the City of London Police whilst drafting this decision report. It should be noted that casualty data can takes some time to be loaded onto the police system when the Police have not been in attendance. The reasons for late entry to the City of London Police system are as follows;

‘A considerable number of personal injury collisions are not reported to Police at the time of occurrence and are subsequently reported at a later time which can be from a few days to several months.


Such collisions are either reported online directly to the City of London Police or by the person attending a Police Station, which can be anywhere in the country, and completing a self-report form. Reports to other Police Forces pass through that Force’s internal systems before being received by the City of London Police and this can take considerable time.

Reports received on line, or from other Forces, have to be manually entered on to the Force’s computer system for further action, and onto the DfT CRASH system for statistical purposes. This information is only visible once that process has been completed.”

Additionally, some collisions on or near the City of London Police Force boundary are dealt with at the scene by the Metropolitan Police. When the data is verified, the casualty information is then transferred to the correct authority.


4. Figure 21 below shows the casualty datasets being used by officers to inform this report and an indication as to the data’s likelihood in being amended in the future.

Figure 21: Datasets used and officer confidence level



5. As figure 21 shows, a combination of datasets are being used to report on casualties. Reporting exclusively on STATS19 data would be the most accurate method of reporting, however this would severely limit the ability for Members to make an informed decision within the timeframe of the experimental period. The September to December 2017 data set is possible, but less likely to change again. This is because incidents not requiring police attendance at the scene are most likely to have been reported within six months and processed by the various forces.
6. 12 months of post-scheme casualty data made up of both provisionally verified STATS19 data and City of London Police data is therefore being used with the caveat that this data is subject to change. 12 months of provisionally verified STATS19 data is not expected to be available until February 2019. The use of provisional data was set out in the Bank on Safety monitoring strategy.
7. It should be noted that until 12-months of post-scheme verified STATS19 data is available to officers, it will not be possible to finalise what effect the Bank on Safety scheme has had on casualty numbers at Bank Junction or the monitoring area.
8. The analysis set out below and in the main body of the report is based on the information that has been made available to date and is subject to change.

Figure 22: % change in casualties during operational hours compared to five-year average vs the scheme success criteria.



9. Figure 22 above demonstrates that based on the data currently available for 12 months of operation of the Bank on Safety scheme, it has exceeded its target of casualty reduction within the bank monitoring area and has met the minimum criteria at Bank Junction. It should be noted that given the relative small numbers when looking at one junction, each casualty can change the percentage by a large number.

10. Table 2 below shows the raw figures used to arrive at the five-year annual average which the performance of the scheme is being benchmarked against. Data is for Monday to Friday collisions only.

Table 2: % Total casualty breakdown by area.

	Date Range (from to) excluding weekends		Bank Junction		Bank Monitoring (excluding Bank Junction)		City-Wide (excluding Bank Monitoring and Bank Junction)	
			7am-7pm	7pm-7am	7am-7pm	7pm-7am	7am-7pm	7pm-7am
Post-scheme	22/05/2017	21/05/2018	11	5	59	27*	161	41
Years used for 5-year average	22/05/2016	21/05/2017	13	7	60	29	159	54
	22/05/2015	21/05/2016	10	6	71	21	148	53
	22/05/2014	21/05/2015	15	5	103	16	175	49
	22/05/2013	21/05/2014	23	4	87	27	147	40
	22/05/2012	21/05/2013	15	4	79	19	148	52
5-year average (rounded to whole number)			15	5	80	22	155	50

* there was one collision which resulted in 5 casualties (slight) which is unusual. This one collision represents the 21% increase in 7pm-7am casualties shown in figure 23 below.

Figure 23: Provisional casualty change during operational hours over 12 months (7am to 7pm Monday to Friday) and outside of scheme hours (7pm to 7am Monday to Friday) (five year average figures unrounded)





Figure 23 shows a reduction in casualties during scheme hours at both Bank Junction and in the Bank Monitoring area against the five-year average. When Bank on Safety is not operational no safety impact has been observed at Bank Junction, and an increase in casualties has been observed in the Monitoring area.

Figure 24 below shows the casualty pairings of the 11 post-scheme casualties at Bank Junction which have occurred during operational hours.

Figure 24: Post-Scheme Casualty pairs at Bank Junction during operational hours



11. Below is a breakdown of the 11 casualties that have occurred at Bank Junction during operational hours since the implementation of the scheme;

- In June 2017 a pedestrian and cyclist collided at the Cornhill pedestrian crossing on Bank Junction, resulting in a slight injury to the pedestrian.
- In July 2017, two cyclists collided at the Queen Victoria Street / Walbrook junction, resulting in a slight injury to one of the cyclists.
- In September 2017 a pedestrian and cyclist collided on Poultry, resulting in a serious injury to the cyclist
- In October 2017 a pedestrian and cyclist collided on Mansion House Street, resulting in a serious injury to the pedestrian.
- In November 2017 a pedestrian and cyclist collided on Poultry, resulting in a slight injury to the pedestrian
- In November 2017, a car turned right into a cyclist on Mansion House Street, resulting in a slight injury to the cyclist.
- In November 2017, a pedestrian and cyclist collided at the Cornhill pedestrian crossing on Bank Junction, resulting in a slight injury to the pedestrian and a slight injury to the cyclist.
- In January 2018 a bus applied the brakes on Poultry, causing a standing passenger to fall over, resulting in a slight injury to the passenger.
- In March 2018, a cyclist fell as a result of an interaction with a pedestrian, resulting in a slight injury to the cyclist.
- In May, a pedestrian and cyclist collided on Threadneedle Street, resulting in a slight injury to the pedestrian.

12. Since the implementation of the Bank on Safety scheme there have been a total of 11 recorded casualties at Bank Junction during the scheme's operational hours over a 12-month period, two of which were recorded as serious. Eight of the 11 casualties have occurred as the result of a pedestrian / cyclist collision or interaction. The previous five-year average for collisions of this nature was one per year, suggesting that the Bank on Safety scheme has changed the pattern of collision pairings from predominantly occurring between motor vehicles and pedestrians and cyclists, to between pedestrians and cyclists.

13. The locations of the collisions since the scheme became operational appear to cluster around the junction of Queen Victoria Street/Poultry and also Cornhill. The previous collision pattern was dominant in the centre of the junction. It is believed that subtle engineering improvements could be made to help improve this situation.

14. It should be noted that there has been a general trend change across the City with an increase in pedestrian casualties and pedestrian / cyclist collisions. At Bank it could also be attributed to the perceived traffic-free environment (causing some pedestrians to cross without looking carefully), or a potential increase in some cyclist's speeds.

15. There appears to be a significant casualty saving within the monitoring area during operational hours which strongly implies that casualties haven't simply been displaced from Bank junction to the surrounding area.

16. From this early casualty data for Bank, it suggests that behaviour is contributing to collisions, so behaviour change programmes may help to reduce this type of collision. These programmes of work are already underway as part of the road

danger reduction programme. Overall whilst there is still work to do, the experiment has so far had a positive impact on reducing casualty numbers at Bank junction during operational hours. There are also strong indications that the schemes operation is making a positive difference to the casualty numbers in the wider monitoring area.